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How Does Privatization Work in China? 
Abstract 
Using a comprehensive panel data set of China’s state-owned enterprises, we investigate 
the impacts of privatization, of different time sequences and extent of non-state 
ownership, on social welfare and firm performance. Attention has been focused on the 
sources of gain in firm performance and the long-run impacts of privatization. It is found 
that the privatization of China’s state-owned enterprises was achieved with limited 
compromise on social welfare responsibilities, and significant gain in firm performance 
was obtained by motivating the management and reducing agency cost at the 
management level.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
An issue of perennial research interest is why certain organizations persist over time 
despite of their inefficiency. A case in point is China’s state-owned enterprises. State-
owned enterprises have poor financial performance as compared with China’s private 
enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises operating in China.1 The existence of some of 
these state-owned enterprises cannot be justified, even from a social welfare point of 
view. Yet China’s state-owned enterprises are slow to undergo privatization.2 It is 
understood that an organization, once in existence, will lead to the formation of various 
interest groups, and any organizational change is resisted by those groups whose interests 
would be adversely affected. Thus, the key to understanding organizational changes lies 
in the proper delineation of relevant interest groups and analysis of their payoff changes 
in the process of change.3 Using a comprehensive panel data set of Chinese enterprises, 
we investigate how the interests of various parties affiliated with state-owned enterprises 
are affected during the privatization process. It is found that privatization of China’s 
state-owned enterprises was achieved with little compromise on social welfare 
                                                 
1 Indeed, studies have shown that reform and privatization of China’s state-owned enterprises have led to 
significant improvements in efficiency and performance (Gordon and Li, 1995; Groves, Hong, McMillan, 
and Naughton, 1994, 1995; Li, 1997; Li and Xu, 2004; Zhang, Zhang, and Zhao, 2001). See Djankov and 
Murrell (2002) for a survey of enterprise restructuring in the transition economies, and Megginson and 
Netter (2001) for a survey of privatization in both developed and developing economies. 
2 There are studies focusing on the incentives for the Chinese central and local governments to privatize its 
state-owned enterprises (Bai, Lu, and Tao, 2005; Bai, Lu, and Tao, 2006; Guo and Yao, 2005; Li and Lui, 
2004).  
3 For a recent study on the role of interest parties for and against privatization in the telecom sector, see Li 
and Xu (2002).  
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responsibilities, and much gain in post-privatization firm performance was achieved by 
motivating management and reducing the agency cost at the management level. 
 
In general, an enterprise has various interest groups affiliated with it: suppliers, customers, 
and governments. Suppliers (including those of labor services, management services, 
capital inputs, and other inputs) would like the enterprise to pay higher prices for the 
inputs, customers prefer the enterprise to set lower prices for the outputs, and the 
governments seek to collect more taxes from the enterprise. However, the owners of the 
enterprise are the key stakeholders, with an objective of profit maximization. They 
manage the enterprise themselves or delegate the management to professionals. Any 
agency cost arising from the separation of ownership and management, as in the case of 
publicly held firms, could be dealt with through monitoring by the board members, proxy 
fights by the shareholders, or corporate takeovers in the capital market.  State-owned 
enterprises in China are very much like the publicly held firms of the developed 
economies in the sense that their ownership is widely held by all people in the society, 
but the de facto control of the state-owned enterprises is held by the State Assets Agency 
– the equivalent of a board of directors. What is different in China is that the owners (all 
people in the society) do not have any direct authority in choosing the members of the 
State Assets Agency and appointing the management of state-owned enterprises.4 The 
State Assets Agency may have social welfare objectives other than profit maximization 
(Bai, Li, Tao, and Wang, 2000), and the management appointed by the State Assets 
Agency is neither motivated nor disciplined for profit maximization. So long as senior 
management staff meets the social welfare objectives of the State Assets Agency, they 
are free to pursue their personal interests, thereby resulting in severe agency costs.  
 
Privatization of state-owned enterprises will lead to a change in payoffs for the suppliers, 
customers, governments, and owners. In this paper, we use a panel data set of 15,496 
enterprises from 1998 to 2003 to examine in detail how privatization of China’s state-
owned enterprises affects the interests of the concerned parties. All the firms in the 
                                                 
4 It is the ruling party of China – Chinese Communist Party – that decides on the membership of the State 
Assets Agency.  
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sample were 100% state-owned in 1998, and 2,866 (18.50%) of them had privatization of 
different degrees during the sample period. The data-set provides information on firm 
operation, performance, and productivity. It also provides information on the social 
welfare responsibilities of state-owned enterprises, such as size of employment, wages 
and benefits per employee, prices of main products, and government taxes. Clearly, the 
data is rich enough for us to measure how payoffs change for various interest groups 
affiliated with China’s state-owned enterprises: customers, suppliers (employees and 
management), and governments.  
 
In this study, we look at the following indicators of firm performance and social welfare 
responsibilities. There are: (1) social welfare indicators on labor (size of employment, 
wage per employee, and welfare per employee), consumers (price index), and 
governments (tax payments, inclusive and exclusive of value-added taxes), (2) indicators 
on firm profitability and productivity (logarithm of total assets, logarithm of sales, 
operating income to sales, operating income to total assets, operating income per 
employee, and sales per employee), and (3) individual components of the operating 
income to sales (profits from main products to sales, profits from other products to sales, 
managerial expenses to sales, and financial expenses to sales).  
 
Our results show that the extent of labor layoffs in China’s privatization is not as 
significant as in many other countries (for example, Mexico, as studied by La Porta and 
Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999). While those who lost their jobs are worse off in the 
privatization process, those retained have actually benefited from higher wages and better 
welfare. Regarding the impact of privatization on other social welfare objectives, we find 
that price index decreases with the extent of privatization (i.e., consumers benefit from 
the privatization) while there is no statistically significant change in tax payments. Both 
firm profitability and productivity are found to increase in the percentage of non-state 
ownership or the extent of privatization. In addition, much of the improvement in the 
“operating income to sales” comes from the reduction in “managerial expenses to sales” 
(53.85%) and the decrease in “financial expenses to sales” (35.91%). To conclude, our 
analysis suggests that privatization of China’s state-owned enterprises is achieved with 
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limited compromise on social welfare responsibilities, and much of the improvement in 
firm performance comes from the reduction in agency costs at the management level. 
Anecdotal evidence does suggest that state-owned enterprises generally have bloated 
management structure with an excessive amount of managerial expenses. This is because 
the State Assets Agency has social welfare objectives, and so long as the management 
meets those objectives, it is neither motivated nor disciplined for profit maximization. 
Hence, the challenge for privatization of state-owned enterprises lies in transferring the 
control of state-owned enterprises from the State Assets Agency to shareholders, and then 
introducing incentive and/or disciplinary mechanisms for the management to pursue 
profit maximization. Given that the size of employment decreased with the extent of 
privatization, the other challenge for privatization of state-owned enterprises is to protect 
the interests of those unlucky workers and maintain social stability (Bai, Li, Tao, and 
Wang, 2000).  
 
Unlike the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, China has taken a 
gradual approach to privatizing its state-owned enterprises. Therefore there might be 
subsequent privatization after the initial (partial) privatization. Indeed in our sample there 
are firms that underwent up to four rounds of partial privatization. It is therefore 
important to know how well the first partial privatization works and if the subsequent 
rounds of privatization add any value. It is also interesting to know if there is any 
threshold level of non-state ownership (say, 50%) above which there will be significant 
effects of privatization. We find that the first privatization has the largest impact on 
profitability (operating income to total assets and operating income to sales) and 
productivity (operating income per employee and sales per employee). The second 
privatization still has some impact, but subsequent ones do not. The combined extent of 
privatization in the first and second rounds could be either above or below 50%. 
Consistently, we find that privatization – including privatization that reduced state 
ownership below 50% and the one that kept state ownership more than 50% – has 
significant impacts on firm profitability and productivity, though the former has stronger 
effects than the latter.  
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An important indicator for the success of organizational changes such as the privatization 
of China’s state-owned enterprises is sustained performance improvement in the long run. 
Under-reporting financial performance prior to privatization does not lead to sustainable 
success in the long run; nor do one-time government subsidies at the time of privatization 
(Frydman, Gary, Hessel, and Rapaczynski, 1999; Song and Yao, 2004). To address this 
concern, we look at the long-run performance of privatized firms, and find that there is 
sustainable improvement in the profitability and productivity up to four years after the 
privatization. Furthermore, the main source of sustained performance improvement 
remains the reduction of managerial expenses. This suggests that once a state-owned 
enterprise is privatized through either management buyout or by outside investors, there 
emerge real (not nominal) and active shareholders who would put pressure on the State 
Assets Agency, or the board of directors, to pursue profit maximization. Incentive and/or 
disciplinary systems are then put in place to streamline and motivate the management, 
which leads to sustainable performance improvement in the long run.  
 
In establishing the impact of privatization on firm performance, we need to control for a 
potential selection bias problem: that firms undergoing privatization may have some 
unobserved characteristics explaining their superior post-privatization performance. As 
China has taken a gradual and selective approach to privatizing its state-owned 
enterprises (Cao, Qian, and Weingast, 1999), the selection bias problem is a serious 
concern. To deal with this issue, we use the firm fixed-effect estimation method in case 
there are unobserved firm-specific time-invariant factors influencing firm performance. 
There could also be unobserved time-variant factors affecting firms that underwent 
privatization differently than those that did not. To control for this possibility, we focus 
on a sub-sample of 2,866 firms that all had privatization in the sample period (i.e., from 
1999 to 2003), and compare the performance in the time period of 1998 to 2002 of those 
enterprises privatized from 1999 to 2002 with those that did not have privatization until 
2003. The firm fixed-effect model, together with the refinement of the sample, helps us to 
control for the selection bias problems in the privatization analysis.  
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe our sample of Chinese 
state-owned enterprises, and offer some summary statistics. The method of econometric 
analysis and the results are presented in Section 3. The paper concludes with Section 4.  
 
 
2. Data  
 
Our data is based on the annual surveys of manufacturing and mining firms conducted by 
the National Bureau of Statistics of China from 1998 to 2003. These annual surveys 
cover all state-owned enterprises, and those non-state-owned enterprises that had five 
millions or more RMB (Chinese currency) annual sales. The number of enterprises 
covered in the surveys varied from approximately 162,000 to approximately 196,000.5 
The data contain enterprise identification information, and their operation and 
performance information extracted from balance sheets and income statements.  
 
We first use the enterprise identification code, uniquely assigned to each enterprise by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, to search for those enterprises that appeared in 
each year of the sample period (1998-2003) and come up with a balanced panel data-set 
of 61,163 enterprises.6 As our objective is to understand how privatization works in 
China, we focus on a sub-sample of enterprises that were 100% state-owned in 1998.7 
Among the 61,163 enterprises in the balanced panel, 17,126 of them were 100% state-
owned in 1998. There are enterprises in which the state ownership first decreased from 
100% and then went up during the sample period; after deleting these reversal cases the 
                                                 
5 The numbers of firms surveyed from 1998 to 2003 are, respectively, 164,981, 161,888, 162,755, 171,117, 
181,428, and 196,222.  
6 We use the panel data-set to examine whether subsequent privatization adds any value to the initial 
privatization, and also investigate the long-run impacts of partial privatization.  
7 For each enterprise the data-set has information on its sources of capital. China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics classifies six possible sources of capital: state-owned capital, collectively-owned capital, private 
capital, capital from HMT (Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) investors, capital from foreign investors, and 
legal-person capital, the last of which can be further classified into state-owned legal-person capital and 
collectively-owned legal-person capital and can be combined with state-owned capital and collectively-
owned capital respectively.  
 7
sample size is reduced to 15,496.8 Among the 15,496 enterprises that were 100% state-
owned in 1998, 12,630 of them remained fully state-owned until 2003 and 2,866 of them 
were privatized to various degrees by 2003.9 
 
Our sample of 15,496 enterprises is highly comprehensive, as it covers all of the 39 
mining and manufacturing industries and all of the 31 Chinese regions. For each industry, 
Tables 1a and 1b show, respectively, the absolute number and percentage of first 
privatization during the entire sample period. Medical and pharmaceutical products had 
the highest percentage of first privatization (43.63%), followed by beverage production 
(36%), chemical fiber (35%), raw chemical materials and chemical products (28.57%), 
and nonmetal mineral products (26.06%). Other minerals mining and dressing was the 
only industry that had no privatization at all during the sample period, followed by 
production and supply of tap water (3.95%), tobacco processing (3.97%), petroleum and 
natural gas extraction (5%), and logging and transport of timber and bamboo (7.41%). 
For each of the 31 Chinese regions, Tables 1c and 1d show, respectively, the absolute 
number and percentage of first privatization during the sample period. Jiangsu province 
had the highest percentage of first privatization (45.44%), followed by Shandong 
(31.38%) and Sichuan (31.16%). Tianjin had the lowest percentage of first privatization 
(4.13%), with Guizhou (6.36%) and Tibet (7.14%) being the second and third lowest of 
the 31 Chinese regions.   
 
Among the 15,496 enterprises that were 100% state-owned in 1998, 2,866 had (first-time) 
privatization during the remaining sample period (i.e., 1999-2003). Four hundred 
seventy-one of the 2,866 enterprises had a subsequent (second-time) privatization; 90 out 
of the 471 enterprises had a third-time privatization; and finally, 13 out of the 90 
                                                 
8 The reversal cases are not considered, as the rationales for this type of organizational changes could be 
quite different from those of gradual and increasing privatization.  
9 Any decrease in state ownership is referred to as privatization. Here we do not further classify 
privatization by the types of new capital, which could be collectively-owned, privately owned, HMT 
ownership, or foreign ownership. Frydman, Gary, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999) analyzed how the 
benefits of privatization might vary with respect to the types of new, non-state ownership. There are other 
types of restructuring and privatization in China, such as share-issuing privatization (Sun and Tong, 2003; 
Wang, Xu and Zhu, 2004), shareholding ownership (Jefferson and Su, 2005), and privatization of township 
and village enterprises (Li and Rozelle, 2000).  
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enterprises had a fourth-time privatization. See Table 2 for details. Sixty-five percent of 
the first privatizations was complete privatization (i.e., zero state-ownership), with the 
corresponding numbers for the second, third and fourth privatization being 54%, 51%, 
and 54%, respectively. Seventy-five percent of the first privatizations led to majority 
control by non-state ownership (i.e., less than 50% state-ownership), with the 
corresponding numbers for the second, third, and fourth privatization being 74%, 73%, 
and 85%, respectively.  
 
We examine the impact of privatization using two sets of indicators: one for social 
welfare responsibilities and the other for firm performance. The set of indicators for 
social welfare responsibilities measure the effects of privatization on labor (logarithm of 
employment, wage per employee, and welfare per employee), consumers (price index), 
and governments (tax payments), where price index is the ratio of current value of total 
output to constant value (in 1990 price) of total output, and tax payments are those 
inclusive of value-added taxes and those exclusive of value-added taxes.10 The set of 
indicators for firm performance include: size of operation (logarithm of total assets, and 
logarithm of sales), profitability (operating income to total assets and operating income to 
sales), and productivity (operating income per employee and sales per employee). To 
investigate further the sources for the increase in firm profitability, we decompose 
operating income to sales into four components: profits from main products, profits from 
other products, managerial expenses to sales, and financial expenses to sales.11 
 
The definition of the above indicators on social welfare responsibilities and firm 
performance is summarized in Table 3.  
 
 
                                                 
10 As value-added taxes tend to fluctuate with inventories across years, the tax payments both inclusive and 
exclusive of the value-added taxes are used to measure the contributions made by the enterprises to 
government tax revenue.  
11 Operating income is the sum of profits from main products and profits from other products, minus the 
managerial expenses and financial expenses. Profits from main products is equal to net sales revenue minus 
production cost, sales costs, and sales taxes; Managerial expenses include all the expenses incurred for the 
administrative purposes, such as salary and welfare, entertaining costs, meeting expenses, and traveling 
expenses of administrative staff; Financial expenses include net interests paid and commission charged by 
banks. 
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3. Econometric analysis 
 
3.1. The impact of privatization on social welfare and firm profitability 
 
To establish the exact effect of privatization on firm performance, we need to control for 
the potential selection bias problem. China has taken a gradual and selective approach to 
privatizing its state-owned enterprises. This raises the issue of whether the performance 
change of privatized firms really comes from their ownership change or if it is due to 
some unobserved features of those state-owned enterprises selected for privatization.12 
Ideally, all aspects of privatized firms, both time-variant and time-invariant, need to be 
taken into consideration before the residue in performance is assigned to the ownership 
effect. In practice, we do not have the complete list of time-variant and time-invariant 
variables, and we compensate that by using two estimation strategies. First, privatized 
firms may have some unobserved firm-specific and time-invariant characteristics that 
could explain their superior performance. To address this concern, we follow Frydman, 
Gray, Hessel and Rapaczyski (1999) and Gupta (2005) by estimating firm fixed-effect 
models that could account for those unobserved firm-specific and time-invariant 
characteristics. Second, it is also possible that there are some time-variant characteristics 
separating state-owned firms that were privatized from those that were not. To address 
this concern, we restrict our sample to those state-owned enterprises that were privatized 
from 1999 to 2003, and compare the performance of those that were privatized from 1999 
to 2002 with those that didn’t get privatized until 2003, over the time period 1998-2002. 
Presumably, state-owned enterprises that were privatized in later years may share some 
time-variant characteristics with those privatized in earlier years, and therefore they are a 
better comparison group than those never privatized in the sample period. To summarize, 
we first estimate the following benchmark model using a sample of 2,866 enterprises that 
were state-owned in 1998 but were privatized in the remaining sample period (1999-
2003).    
 
                                                 
12 Similarly, in deciding whether to privatize state-owned enterprises, China’s local and central 
governments may consider its impact on social welfare, and hence the possible selection bias problem. 
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, 0 , 1 , 2 , ,i t i t t i t i t j t i ty Year X NonSShr HHIα α α α α ε= + + + + + ,    (1) 
where ,i ty is the performance indicator of firm i in year t , ,i tX is a set of time-variant firm-
specific factors that could explain the performance indicator, tYear is a set of year 
dummies capturing possible differences in the macroeconomic environment during the 
sample period, ,j tHHI  is Herfindahl Index of 2-digit industry j in year t, 
,i tNonSShr indicates the percentage of non-state ownership in year t ,  iα captures time-
invariant firm-specific fixed effect, and ,i tε is the error term.  
 
All the performance indicators ( ,i ty ) considered in this study are listed in groups 1-3 of 
Table 3, corresponding to the indicators on social welfare responsibilities, firm 
performance, and individual components of the operating income to sales. The set of 
time-variant firm-specific factors ( ,i tX ) include:  surplus labor ratio, debt equity ratio, 
percentage of new products in total output, and percentage of fixed assets for operation in 
total fixed assets. 13,14 The summary statistics of ,i ty , ,i tX , ,i tNonSShr , and ,j tHHI  are 
given in Table 3. Throughout the following analysis, we will focus on the impact of non-
state ownership (or its variations) on the performance indicators. The effects of  ,i tX  
and ,j tHHI  on the performance indicators will not be formally discussed.  
 
Table 4 summarizes the estimation results of the benchmark model (1). Panel A is about 
the impact of privatization on the social welfare responsibilities of state-owned 
enterprises. It is found that the size of employment decreases with the extent of 
                                                 
13 Surplus labor ratio is defined as the percentage of workers who would be laid off if the company were 
operating at the industry-average level of sales per capita. It is equal to 
i
i
i S
S L)LL( ∗−  where iL or iS  is firm 
'i s  employment (or sales), and L (or S) is the industry-average employment (or sales) calculated at the 2-
digit industry level using annual surveys on manufacturing firms of year t ; debt assets ratio equals total 
liabilities over total assets of firm i in year t ; new products ratio is the percentage of new products in total 
outputs. Under China’s statistical classification, a product is considered new if it is produced for the first 
time in an industry or a region, and such status is given only for the first four years of production.  
14 In regressions on performance indicators which are relevant to labor, we exclude the surplus labor ratio 
from ,i tX . These performance indicators include logarithm of labor, wage per labor, welfare per labor, 
operating income per employee, and sales per employee. 
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privatization (the percentage of non-state ownership), while both the wage per employee 
and welfare per employee increase with the extent of privatization. Thus, concerning the 
interests of workers, there are both winners (those retained) and losers (those laid off). 
Price index is found to decrease with the extent of privatization, suggesting that 
consumers are better off in the privatization process. This is in contrast to the result from 
the literature that once privatized, former state-owned enterprises are no longer subject to 
government regulations and hence tend to raise prices for their products and services (La 
Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999). Besides the social welfare responsibilities to workers 
and customers, state-owned enterprises are also expected to provide a significant share of 
tax revenue for governments to undertake public-good projects. Studies have also 
revealed that, even with the same tax rates, state-owned enterprises have much less 
incentive to hide business activities and evade taxation than privately-owned companies 
(Cai, Liu and Xiao, 2005). It is thus conjectured that the tax payments shall decrease with 
the extent of privatization. However, our estimation results show that privatization has no 
statistically significant effect on the tax payments, both inclusive and exclusive of value-
added taxes. To the extent that privatization leads to greater sales and higher operating 
income, our results still lend support to the conjectured decrease in the tax payments.  
 
Panel B is about the impact of privatization on firm performance. The logarithm of sales 
increases with the extent of privatization, but the logarithm of total assets decreases with 
the percentage of non-state ownership. Two measures of profitability, operating income 
to sales and operating income to total assets, are increasing in the percentage of non-state 
ownership, both with the 1% statistical significance. In addition, two measures of labor 
productivity, operating income per employee and sales per employee, are also increasing 
with the extent of privatization, again both with the 1% statistical significance. Taken 
together, the results summarized in panels A and B reveal that privatized firms employ 
fewer workers and work with fewer assets, but they manage to achieve higher sales and 
operating income. Clearly, privatization leads to significant improvements in firm 
performance.  
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For owners of the privatized firms, operating income to sales is one of the most important 
measures of firm performance. To better understand the sources of gain in operating 
income to sales, we examine its individual components: (1) profits from main products to 
sales, (2) profits from other products to sales, (3) managerial expenses to sales, and (4) 
financial expenses to sales. The operating income to sales is the sum of (1) and (2), minus 
(3) and (4). As shown in Panel C, higher (post-privatization) operating income to sales 
comes from lower managerial expenses to sales, lower financial expenses to sales, higher 
profits from main products to sales, and lower profits from other products to sales, with 
the first three being 1% statistically significant and the last one being 10% statistically 
significant. More importantly, the reduction in the managerial expenses to sales and that 
in the financial expenses to sales contributed, respectively, 53.85% and 35.91% of the 
gain in the operating income to sales. In contrast, the profits from main and other 
products to sales contributed a combined 10.24% of the gain in the operating income to 
sales. These results reveal that much of the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises lies in 
agency cost at the management level. China’s state-owned enterprises, though nominally 
owned by all people in the society, are actually controlled by the State Assets Agency, 
which has multiple social welfare objectives other than profit maximization and appoints 
management to meet those objectives. The management of state-owned enterprises is 
neither motivated nor disciplined to pursue profit maximization. Without legitimized 
ownership to the cash flows of state-owned enterprises, the management cares more 
about the size of the operation than the bottom line, and enjoys the perks accompanying 
with the scale of the operation, resulting in severe agency cost at the management level. 
With privatization, however, there emerge real (not nominal) and active shareholders, 
who put pressure on the State Assets Agency or the board of directors to pursue profit 
maximization and motivate management for that objective.   
 
From the estimation results of benchmark model (1), we can conclude that privatization 
of China’s state-owned enterprises was achieved with limited compromise on the social 
welfare responsibilities, and much gain was obtained by motivating and monitoring 
management for profit maximization. 
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3.2. Partial privatization 
 
China has taken a gradual approach to privatizing its state-owned enterprises. Initial 
privatization tends to be partial in scope, and is often followed by subsequent 
privatization. It is thus interesting to know how well the first (often partial) privatization 
works in terms of its impact on social welfare and firm performance, or whether the 
subsequent privatization adds any value to the first privatization. To investigate the 
effects of initial and subsequent privatizations, we replace the percentage of non-state 
ownership of model (1) – a key independent variable representing the extent of 
privatization – by four indicator variables for the privatization sequence. The revised 
econometric model is as follows: 
 
, 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , ,_ _ _ _i t i t t i t i t i t i t i t j t i ty Year X First priv Second priv Third priv Fourth priv HHIα α α α α α α α ε= + + + + + + + +
            
  ……………………….(2) 
 
,_ i tFirst priv equals one for year t and the years thereafter if firm i was privatized in year t  
for the first time, and zero otherwise. ,_ i tSecond priv , ,_ i tThird priv , and ,_ i tFourth priv are 
defined similarly. Here, only four indicator variables are introduced because firms in our 
sample went through at most four rounds of partial privatization.  
 
 
Table 5 summarizes the estimation results of model (2). The signs and statistical 
significance of First_Priv in Table 5 are almost the same as those of the percentage of 
non-state ownership in Table 4. Specifically, with the first privatization, (1) the size of 
employment decreases, but both the wage per employee and welfare per employee 
increase, (2) the logarithm of sales increases, (3) both the operating income to total assets 
and the operating income to sales increase, (4) both operating income per employee and 
sales per employee increase, and (5) much of the gain in the operating income to sales 
comes from the reduction in the managerial expenses to sales and the reduction in the 
financial expenses to sales, not from the increase in profits from main or other products. 
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The results on price index and the logarithm of total assets are no longer statistically 
significant. The only different and statistically significant result is that the tax payments, 
both inclusive and exclusive of the value-added taxes, actually increased after the first 
privatization. Thus we can conclude that the first privatization works very effectively no 
matter how partial it is. As for the benefits of subsequent privatization, we find that the 
second-time privatization still adds value in terms of greater operation (logarithm of 
sales), higher firm profitability (operating income to total assets and operating income to 
sales) and higher firm productivity (operating income per employee). With the second-
time privatization, the size of employment reversed its decline and started to increase, but 
the wage and welfare per employee continued to increase. The tax payments (both 
inclusive and exclusive of value-added taxes) also continued to increase. Our results, 
however, show that any further (third-time or fourth-time) privatization adds little value 
in almost all performance indicators.    
 
The results of the first and subsequent privatization seem to suggest that the scope of 
privatization is not critically important in the case of China. One may argue, however, 
that in our sample 75% of the state-owned enterprises undergoing the first privatization 
were no longer state-controlled (i.e., less than 50% state ownership) and an additional 
45% of the state-owned enterprises undergoing the second privatization were controlled 
by non-state owners (see Table 2 for details). Thus the question of whether it is important 
to have more than 50% non-state ownership in order to have any impact of privatization 
must be addressed.15 To address this question, we replace the percentage of non-state 
ownership in model (1) by two indicator variables about whether the state still has 
majority control after the privatization. The modified estimation model is as follows:  
 
, 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , ,_ _i t i t t i t i t i t j t i ty Year X NonSShr Maj NonSShr Min HHIα α α α α α ε= + + + + + +  
            
 ……………………….. (3),  
 
                                                 
15 Using data on telecom sector privatization around the world, Li and Xu (2004) found that only full 
privatization led to substantial improvement in allocation of capital and labor, output expansion, network 
penetration, and labor and total factor productivity. 
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where ,_ i tNonSShr Maj equals 1 if non-state ownership in firm i is higher than fifty 
percent in year t  and zero otherwise; ,_ i tNonSShr Min equals 1 if non-state ownership in 
firm i is lower or equal to fifty percent in year t  and zero otherwise. As shown in Table 6, 
firm profitability (measured by operating income to total assets and operating income to 
sales) improves after the privatization, regardless of who has majority control; so do the 
two measures of productivity (operating income per employee and sales per employee). 
However, judging by the size of coefficients, privatization that resulted in majority 
control by non-state owners has a bigger impact on firm profitability and productivity 
than privatization with the state retaining more than 50% ownership. For privatization 
with majority non-state ownership, much of the gain in the operating income to sales still 
comes from the reduction of managerial expenses to sales, reduction of financial 
expenses to sales, and profits from main products (in the decreasing order of importance); 
but the reduction of managerial expenses to sales is no longer a major source of gain for 
privatization with minority non-state ownership. On social welfare responsibilities, both 
privatization with majority non-state ownership and that with minority non-state 
ownership have positive impacts on the wage and welfare per employee. However, the 
size of employment increased and the price index also increased under privatization with 
minority non-state ownership, while both decreased under privatization with majority 
non-state ownership. On the tax payments, only privatization with minority non-state 
ownership has positive and statistically significant impact.  
 
Taken together, our results on partial privatization (first versus subsequent privatization, 
and privatization with the state retaining more than 50% ownership versus that with less 
than 50% state ownership) suggest that, no matter how limited the scope of the 
privatization is, it introduces real (not nominal) and active shareholders who put pressure 
on the State Assets Agency or the board of directors to pursue profit maximization 
instead of some social welfare objectives. Incentive systems are then put in place to 
motivate management to streamline the management structure (i.e., reducing the agency 
cost) and improve firm performance and productivity.  
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3.3. Long-run impact of privatization 
 
The analysis in the previous two sections has found significant impact of privatization on 
firm performance and social welfare responsibilities. The estimation models (1)-(3) used 
in the analysis, however, impose a restriction of uniform impact of privatization (the 
percentage of non-state ownership) across the sample period. There is anecdotal evidence 
that state-owned enterprises tend to take actions of short-term and transitory effects, such 
as under-reporting their financial performance prior to privatization or receiving large 
one-off subsidies during the privatization process. However, the success of China’s state-
owned enterprises privatization hinges upon the sustained impact on firm performance 
and social welfare responsibilities. To investigate the long-run impact of privatization, we 
modify model (1) by replacing the percentage of non-state ownership by four interaction 
terms between the percentages of non-state ownership with dummy variables indicating 
the number of years after the initial privatization (Song and Yao, 2005). The revised 
estimation model is as follows: 
 
 
 
4
, 0 , 1 , ,
1
_ *i t i t t i t k k t j t i t
k
y Year X Year AfterPriv NoSShr HHIα α α α β ε
=
= + + + + +∑  
………………………………. (4),  
 
 
 
The year of initial privatization is defined as year 1 after privatization. 
_kYear AfterPriv is equal to 1 for the year in which firm i has been privatized for k years. 
Since the earliest possible privatization in our sample occurred in 1999 and the time 
period examined for firm performance and social welfare responsibilities runs from 1998 
to 2002, the highest number of years after initial privatization (or subscript k) is 4.  In 
model (4), privatization is allowed to have differential impacts across the sample period. 
Assume that a state-owned enterprise had a partial privatization of 10% non-state 
ownership in 1999. Then the same percentage of non-state ownership (10%) could have 
impact α1 on a performance indicator of year 1999, impact α2 on the performance 
indicator of year 2000, impact α3 on the performance indicator of year 2001, and impact 
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α4 on the performance indicator of year 2002. If the impact of non-state ownership on the 
performance indicator decreases across the sample period (i.e., αk decreasing with respect 
to k), then there is limited long-rum impact of privatization.  
 
As shown in Table 7, the negative impact of non-state ownership on the size of 
employment was steady and significant up to four years after the privatization, while the 
positive effects of non-state ownership on the wage and welfare per employee increased 
throughout the post-privatization period. The price index did not have any statistically 
significant change in the first year of privatization, but then had a pronounced decrease 
up to four years after the privatization. As in our benchmark case (model (1)), the impact 
of non-state ownership on the tax payments was insignificant and remained so in the 
post-privatization period. 
 
The increase in firm profitability (operating income to total assets and operating income 
to sales) was significant in the first two years after privatization, and then became steady. 
Possibly due to the steady decrease in the size of employment, the improvement in firm 
productivity (operating income per employee and sales per employee) was significant and 
increasing throughout the post-privatization period. As in our benchmark case (model 
(1)), much of the gain in the operating income to sales comes from the reduction in the 
managerial expenses to sales and the reduction in the financial expenses to sales, not 
from the increase in the profits from main products. More significantly, the decreases in 
the managerial expenses to sales and in the financial expenses to sales were significant 
and widening throughout the post-privatization period. In contrast, the increase in the 
profits from main products was significant only up to two years after the privatization. 
With a survey data of 218 privatized and state-owned enterprises in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, Frydman, Gary, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999) found immediate 
but no sustained impact of privatization. Based on a data-set of over 6,000 privatized and 
state-owned enterprises in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia, Claessens and Djankov (2002) found that the impacts of 
privatization were small at the beginning but then grew over time. Song and Yao (2004) 
used a relatively small sample of Chinese firms and found no immediate but gradual and 
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sustained effects of privatization. Our analysis shows that there was both immediate and 
sustained improvement in firm profitability and productivity throughout the post-
privatization period, and it lends strong support to the success of China’s state-owned 
enterprises privatization.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Since China started its economic reform in the late 1970s, its economy has experienced 
some of the most spectacular growth in its history. Much of China’s economic growth, 
however, has been driven by its private enterprises, even though property rights 
protection was not formally written into China’s constitution until March 2004, and 
multinationals operating in China. State-owned enterprises have been losing their 
competitive position in the market place, and yet the Chinese government has been slow 
in privatizing those enterprises. It has been suggested that China’s state-owned 
enterprises are maintained for serving various social welfare objectives (consumer 
welfare, government tax revenue, and workers’ interests) rather than profit maximization. 
China’s state-owned enterprises are theoretically owned by all people in the society, but 
they are effectively controlled by the State Assets Agency, who has multiple social 
welfare objectives. The management of a state-owned enterprise – appointed by the State 
Assets Agency – needs to meet the social welfare objectives, but beyond that the 
management is neither motivated nor disciplined to pursue profit maximization. Instead, 
the management may pursue its private benefits from control – resulting in severe agency 
cost. Thus privatization of China’s state-owned enterprises could well be resisted by the 
various interest parties (social welfare groups and management) whose payoffs might be 
adversely affected by the process.  
 
With the objective of understanding why inefficient organizations such as China’s state-
owned enterprises may persist over time, we use a comprehensive panel data-set of 2,866 
Chinese state-owned enterprises to investigate the impact of privatization on social 
welfare responsibilities and firm performance. We found that the privatization of China’s 
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state-owned enterprises was achieved with limited compromise on the social welfare 
responsibilities: (1) privatization had a negative impact on the size of employment, but 
those employees who retained their jobs had their wage and welfare increased, (2) the 
price index decreased with the extent of privatization, suggesting that consumers 
benefited from the process, and (3) there was no statistically significant impact on the tax 
payments, both inclusive and exclusive of the value-added taxes. We found that 
privatization had a significant impact on firm performance: (1) logarithm of total assets 
decreased but the logarithm of sales increased with the extent of privatization, (2) both 
operating income to sales and operating income to total assets increased with the 
percentage of non-state ownership, and (3) both operating income per employee and sales 
per employee increased with the extent of privatization. The gain in the operating income 
to sales – a key measure for firm performance –  was found to come from, in order of 
decreasing importance, (1) the decrease in the managerial expenses to sales, (2) the 
decrease in the financial expenses to sales, and (3) the increase in profit from main and 
other products. We also examined the robustness of our results to the sequence and extent 
of privatization, and investigated if there was any sustained impact of privatization on 
social welfare responsibilities and firm performance in the long run. Our analysis 
suggests there are two obstacles in the privatization of China’s state-owned enterprises: 
how to ensure the interests of those unlucky workers who were laid off in the 
privatization process, and how to replace the management’s private benefit (managerial 
expenses or agency cost) with incentive mechanisms that motivate the management to 
pursue profit maximization.  
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Table 1 
Definition and Summary Statistics of Variables 
This table reports annual summary statistics for state-owned enterprises used in econometric analyses for the period 1998-2002, 
including firms privatized between 1999 and 2002 and firms privatized in 2003. The number of firms is 2866. The maximum number 
of observations is 14330. 
 
Variable Name Definition Mean STD MAX MIN 
Number of  
Observation 
NonSShr Share of non-state ownership 0.292 0.436 1 0 14330
HHI Herfindahl Index 43.868 57.233 1533.591 4.569 14330
Debt_R Debts to total assets ratio 0.722 0.327 5.921 0 14329
Suplus_Lab Surplus labor ratio 0.451 0.315 0.985 -0.83 14317
NewProdR Percentage of new products in total output 0.043 0.147 1 0 14261
OP_T_FixAss Percentage of fixed assets for operation in total fixed assets 0.817 0.210 1.000 0.277 14299
Log_Labor Logarithm of employee 5.639 1.185 9.122 3.790 14317
Wage_Labor Wage per employee per year (in thousand Yuan per person) 8.026 5.331 42.378 3.000 14317
Welfare_Labor Welfare per employee per year (in thousand Yuan per person) 1.097 0.963 8.237 0 14317
Price Price index (outputs in current price / outputs in price of 1990) 1.421 0.988 11.881 0.419 14223
Tax1 Total amount of tax, including value added tax (in million Yuan) 4.247 12.836 144.237 0 14330
Tax2 Total amount of tax, excluding value added tax (in million Yuan) 1.250 4.062 44.930 0 14330
OI_TA Operating Income to Total Assets 0.001 0.067 0.254 -0.298 14329
OI_S Operating Income to Sales -0.043 0.238 0.910 -5.737 14249
OI_Labor Operating Income per employee (in thousand Yuan per person) 0.708 11.677 68.113 -59.637 14317
S_Labor Sale per employee (in thousand Yuan per person) 108.209 134.637 952.989 9.560 14317
MExp_S Managerial expenses to Sales 0.156 0.191 4.410 0.044 14249
FExp_S Financial expenses to Sales 0.044 0.067 0.824 -0.024 14249
OpProf_S Product selling profit to sales 0.139 0.142 1.065 -1.564 14249
OthProf_S Other profits to sales 0.018 0.109 3.538 -3.417 14249
Log_TA Logarithm of total assets 11.851 1.459 17.500 8.296 14329
Log_S Logarithm of sales 9.805 1.547 14.115 6.910 14249
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Table 2A 
Privatization of SOE during the Sample Period by Industry (Number of Firms) 
    Privatized for the first time in year 
Industry 
SOE 
in 
1998
SOE 
in 
2003 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Coal Mining and Processing 543 431 9 21 18 16 48 
Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction 20 19 0 0 0 0 1 
Ferrous Metals Mining and Dressing 55 49 2 0 2 0 2 
Nonferrous Metals Mining and Dressing 210 178 1 5 1 9 16 
Nonmetal Mining and Dressing 206 170 1 8 2 7 18 
Other Minerals Mining and Dressing 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Logging and Transport of Timber and Bamboo 27 25 0 0 1 0 1 
Food Processing 1048 779 45 52 45 45 82 
Food Production 430 328 21 20 24 13 24 
Beverage Production 350 224 27 31 21 25 22 
Tobacco Processing 126 121 0 0 1 1 3 
Textile Industry 547 410 20 39 24 22 32 
Garment and Other Fiber Products 129 108 4 3 5 3 6 
Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products 69 57 2 1 6 2 1 
Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane, Palm Fiber and Straw Products 104 90 2 1 3 2 6 
Furniture Manufacturing 52 42 3 1 1 0 5 
Papermaking and Paper Products 215 163 12 11 10 7 12 
Printing and Record Medium Reproduction 792 715 8 11 7 17 34 
Cultural, Educational and Sports Goods 73 65 2 2 1 0 3 
Petroleum Refining and Coking 79 59 2 5 5 4 4 
Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 938 670 43 57 64 37 67 
Medical and Pharmaceutical Products 369 208 25 35 37 32 32 
Chemical Fiber 40 26 4 4 2 0 4 
Rubber Products 87 65 6 3 5 3 5 
Plastic Products 199 162 9 2 9 5 12 
Nonmetal Mineral Products 1132 837 72 48 62 43 70 
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 163 124 4 7 9 5 14 
Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals 151 119 7 5 8 4 8 
Metal Products 342 279 19 10 3 13 18 
Ordinary Machinery 841 661 29 39 31 30 51 
Special Purposes Equipment 876 715 21 39 36 27 38 
Transport Equipment 924 800 19 16 23 24 42 
Electric Equipment and Machinery 412 305 22 17 27 13 28 
Electronic and Telecommunications 289 230 12 15 18 6 8 
Instruments, meters, Cultural and Clerical Machinery 210 184 3 8 3 7 5 
Other Manufacturing 87 70 0 4 2 4 7 
Production and Supply of Power, Steam and Hot Water 1756 1612 18 16 26 33 51 
Production and Supply of Gas 134 117 2 0 2 3 10 
Production and Supply of Tap Water 1468 1410 3 5 5 11 34 
Total 15496 12630 479 541 549 473 824 
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Table 2B 
Privatization of SOE during the Sample Period by Industry (Percentage) 
Industry 
(1) 
SOE in 
1998 (Ind 
/ Total)
(2) 
SOE in 
2003 / 
SOE in 
1998 
(3) 
1999 / 
Sum 
(1999 to 
2003) 
(4) 
2000 / 
Sum 
(1999 to 
2003) 
(5) 
2001 / 
Sum 
(1999 to 
2003) 
(6) 
2002 / 
Sum 
(1999 to 
2003) 
(7) 
2003 / 
Sum (1999 
to 2003)
Medical and Pharmaceutical Products 2.38% 56.37% 15.53% 21.74% 22.98% 19.88% 19.88%
Beverage Production 2.26% 64.00% 21.43% 24.60% 16.67% 19.84% 17.46%
Chemical Fiber 0.26% 65.00% 28.57% 28.57% 14.29% 0.00% 28.57%
Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 6.05% 71.43% 16.04% 21.27% 23.88% 13.81% 25.00%
Nonmetal Mineral Products 7.31% 73.94% 24.41% 16.27% 21.02% 14.58% 23.73%
Electric Equipment and Machinery 2.66% 74.03% 20.56% 15.89% 25.23% 12.15% 26.17%
Food Processing 6.76% 74.33% 16.73% 19.33% 16.73% 16.73% 30.48%
Petroleum Refining and Coking 0.51% 74.68% 10.00% 25.00% 25.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Rubber Products 0.56% 74.71% 27.27% 13.64% 22.73% 13.64% 22.73%
Textile Industry 3.53% 74.95% 14.60% 28.47% 17.52% 16.06% 23.36%
Papermaking and Paper Products 1.39% 75.81% 23.08% 21.15% 19.23% 13.46% 23.08%
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 1.05% 76.07% 10.26% 17.95% 23.08% 12.82% 35.90%
Food Production 2.77% 76.28% 20.59% 19.61% 23.53% 12.75% 23.53%
Ordinary Machinery 5.43% 78.60% 16.11% 21.67% 17.22% 16.67% 28.33%
Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals 0.97% 78.81% 21.88% 15.63% 25.00% 12.50% 25.00%
Coal Mining and Processing 3.50% 79.37% 8.04% 18.75% 16.07% 14.29% 42.86%
Electronic and Telecommunications 1.86% 79.58% 20.34% 25.42% 30.51% 10.17% 13.56%
Other Manufacturing 0.56% 80.46% 0.00% 23.53% 11.76% 23.53% 41.18%
Furniture Manufacturing 0.34% 80.77% 30.00% 10.00% 10.00% 0.00% 50.00%
Plastic Products 1.28% 81.41% 24.32% 5.41% 24.32% 13.51% 32.43%
Metal Products 2.21% 81.58% 30.16% 15.87% 4.76% 20.63% 28.57%
Special Purposes Equipment 5.65% 81.62% 13.04% 24.22% 22.36% 16.77% 23.60%
Nonmetal Mining and Dressing 1.33% 82.52% 2.78% 22.22% 5.56% 19.44% 50.00%
Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products 0.45% 82.61% 16.67% 8.33% 50.00% 16.67% 8.33%
Garment and Other Fiber Products 0.83% 83.72% 19.05% 14.29% 23.81% 14.29% 28.57%
Nonferrous Metals Mining and Dressing 1.36% 84.76% 3.13% 15.63% 3.13% 28.13% 50.00%
Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane, Palm Fiber and Straw Products 0.67% 86.54% 14.29% 7.14% 21.43% 14.29% 42.86%
Transport Equipment 5.96% 86.58% 15.32% 12.90% 18.55% 19.35% 33.87%
Production and Supply of Gas 0.86% 87.31% 11.76% 0.00% 11.76% 17.65% 58.82%
Instruments, meters, Cultural and Clerical Machinery 1.36% 87.62% 11.54% 30.77% 11.54% 26.92% 19.23%
Cultural, Educational and Sports Goods 0.47% 89.04% 25.00% 25.00% 12.50% 0.00% 37.50%
Ferrous Metals Mining and Dressing 0.35% 89.09% 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 0.00% 33.33%
Printing and Record Medium Reproduction 5.11% 90.28% 10.39% 14.29% 9.09% 22.08% 44.16%
Production and Supply of Power, Steam and Hot Water 11.33% 91.80% 12.50% 11.11% 18.06% 22.92% 35.42%
Logging and Transport of Timber and Bamboo 0.17% 92.59% 0.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 50.00%
Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction 0.13% 95.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Tobacco Processing 0.81% 96.03% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 20.00% 60.00%
Production and Supply of Tap Water 9.47% 96.05% 5.17% 8.62% 8.62% 18.97% 58.62%
Other Minerals Mining and Dressing 0.02% 100.00% -- -- -- -- -- 
Note: Sorted ascending by column 2. 
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Table 2C  
Privatization of SOE during the Sample Period by Province (Number of Firms) 
 
   Privatized for the first time in year 
Province 
SOE in 
1998 
SOE in 
2003 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Beijing 487 421 14 9 13 13 17
Tianjin 750 719 5 6 7 7 6
Hebei 998 812 31 30 32 30 63
Shanxi 564 465 20 19 18 15 27
Inner Mongolia 272 214 10 18 4 7 19
Liaoning 517 437 18 10 9 16 27
Jilin 453 384 14 12 20 7 16
Heilongjiang 449 375 15 12 19 11 17
Shanghai 556 482 14 18 7 19 16
Jiangsu 702 383 36 70 59 60 94
Zhejiang 459 337 22 43 37 9 11
Anhui 303 235 11 14 7 14 22
Fujian 441 394 7 8 10 8 14
Jiangxi 545 466 4 14 12 13 36
Shandong 889 610 54 54 65 36 70
Henan 1114 927 27 25 28 32 75
Hubei 486 346 21 14 23 32 50
Hunan 450 401 5 7 5 14 18
Guangdong 999 815 43 44 36 27 34
Guangxi 635 589 9 5 11 9 12
Hainan 156 138 2 1 7 3 5
Chongqing 220 179 13 4 7 3 14
Sichuan 568 391 21 32 57 26 41
Guizhou 566 530 6 5 6 4 15
Yunnan 496 380 25 23 25 18 25
Tibet 28 26 0 0 0 0 2
Shaanxi 518 465 11 8 3 11 20
Gansu 403 315 12 13 10 17 36
Qinghai 67 58 1 1 1 4 2
Ningxia 64 52 2 7 2 1 0
Xinjiang 341 284 6 15 9 7 20
Total 15496 12630 479 541 549 473 824
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Table 2D  
Privatization of SOE during the Sample Period by Province (Percentage) 
 
Province 
(1) 
SOE in 1998 
(Ind / Total) 
(2) 
SOE in 2003 / 
SOE in 1998
(3) 
1999 / Sum 
(1999 to 2003)
(4) 
2000 / Sum 
(1999 to 2003)
(5) 
2001 / Sum 
(1999 to 2003)
(6) 
2002 / Sum 
(1999 to 2003) 
(7) 
2003 / Sum 
(1999 to 2003)
Jiangsu 4.53% 54.56% 11.29% 21.94% 18.50% 18.81% 29.47%
Shandong 5.74% 68.62% 19.35% 19.35% 23.30% 12.90% 25.09%
Sichuan 3.67% 68.84% 11.86% 18.08% 32.20% 14.69% 23.16%
Hubei 3.14% 71.19% 15.00% 10.00% 16.43% 22.86% 35.71%
Zhejiang 2.96% 73.42% 18.03% 35.25% 30.33% 7.38% 9.02%
Yunnan 3.20% 76.61% 21.55% 19.83% 21.55% 15.52% 21.55%
Anhui 1.96% 77.56% 16.18% 20.59% 10.29% 20.59% 32.35%
Gansu 2.60% 78.16% 13.64% 14.77% 11.36% 19.32% 40.91%
Inner Mongolia 1.76% 78.68% 17.24% 31.03% 6.90% 12.07% 32.76%
Ningxia 0.41% 81.25% 16.67% 58.33% 16.67% 8.33% 0.00%
Hebei 6.44% 81.36% 16.67% 16.13% 17.20% 16.13% 33.87%
Chongqing 1.42% 81.36% 31.71% 9.76% 17.07% 7.32% 34.15%
Guangdong 6.45% 81.58% 23.37% 23.91% 19.57% 14.67% 18.48%
Shanxi 3.64% 82.45% 20.20% 19.19% 18.18% 15.15% 27.27%
Henan 7.19% 83.21% 14.44% 13.37% 14.97% 17.11% 40.11%
Xinjiang 2.20% 83.28% 10.53% 26.32% 15.79% 12.28% 35.09%
Heilongjiang 2.90% 83.52% 20.27% 16.22% 25.68% 14.86% 22.97%
Liaoning 3.34% 84.53% 22.50% 12.50% 11.25% 20.00% 33.75%
Jilin 2.92% 84.77% 20.29% 17.39% 28.99% 10.14% 23.19%
Jiangxi 3.52% 85.50% 5.06% 17.72% 15.19% 16.46% 45.57%
Beijing 3.14% 86.45% 21.21% 13.64% 19.70% 19.70% 25.76%
Qinghai 0.43% 86.57% 11.11% 11.11% 11.11% 44.44% 22.22%
Shanghai 3.59% 86.69% 18.92% 24.32% 9.46% 25.68% 21.62%
Hainan 1.01% 88.46% 11.11% 5.56% 38.89% 16.67% 27.78%
Hunan 2.90% 89.11% 10.20% 14.29% 10.20% 28.57% 36.73%
Fujian 2.85% 89.34% 14.89% 17.02% 21.28% 17.02% 29.79%
Shanxi 3.34% 89.77% 20.75% 15.09% 5.66% 20.75% 37.74%
Guangxi 4.10% 92.76% 19.57% 10.87% 23.91% 19.57% 26.09%
Tibet 0.18% 92.86% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Guizhou 3.65% 93.64% 16.67% 13.89% 16.67% 11.11% 41.67%
Tianjin 4.84% 95.87% 16.13% 19.35% 22.58% 22.58% 19.35%
Total 100.00% 81.50% 16.71% 18.88% 19.16% 16.50% 28.75%
Note: Sorted ascending by column 2. 
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Table 3 
Sequence of Privatization and Share of State Ownership during the Sample Period 
 
Panel A: First-time Privatization   
 Year of Privatization 
Type of Change in State Ownership  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
All_100%→0% 297 343 356 315 557 1868
All_100%→0%<50% 51 65 62 41 69 288
All_100%→50%=<100% 131 133 131 117 198 710
Total 479 541 549 473 824 2866
       
Panel B: Second-time Privatization       
 Year of Privatization 
Type of Change in State Ownership 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
0%<50%→0%   15 28 30 24 97
0%<50%→0%<50%   10 8 8 11 37
50%=<100%→0%   25 36 39 57 157
50%=<100%→0%<50%   14 18 12 13 57
50%=<100%→50%=<100%   19 27 41 36 123
Total   83 117 130 141 471
       
Panel C: Third-time Privatization       
 Year of Privatization 
Type of Change in State Ownership 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
0%<50%→0%    7 6 11 24
0%<50%→0%<50%    7 5 4 16
50%=<100%→0%    5 7 10 22
50%=<100%→0%<50%    0 2 2 4
50%=<100%→50%=<100%    2 9 13 24
Total     21 29 40 90
       
Panel D: Fourth-time Privatization       
 Year of Privatization 
Type of Change in State Ownership 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
0%<50%→0%     3 2 5
0%<50%→0%<50%     1 2 3
50%=<100%→0%     0 2 2
50%=<100%→0%<50%     0 1 1
50%=<100%→50%=<100%     0 2 2
Total       4 9 13
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Table 4 
The Impact of Non-state Ownership 
This table summarizes the estimation results of model (1). 
 
Panel A: Social Welfare 
    Labor Price Tax 
Independent Variables  
Logarithm of 
Labor Wage per Labor
Welfare per 
Labor Price Index 
Tax (including 
Value Added Tax) 
Tax (excluding 
Value Added Tax)
NonSShr  -0.1775 *** 1.8113*** 0.2154*** -0.0687 *** -0.1331  0.0438  
  (0.0236) (0.1032) (0.0186) (0.0190) (0.2361) (0.0747) 
HHI  0.0024 *** 0.0143*** 0.0023*** 0.0043 *** 0.0556 *** 0.0178 ***
  (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0006) 
              
R square  0.0390 0.0320 0.0343 0.0500 0.0962 0.0958 
Number of Observation  14226  14226  14226  14189  14226  14226  
Note: ***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% percentage, respectively. 
 
Panel B: Firm Performance 
 
    Size of Operation Profitability Productivity 
Independent Variables  
Logarithm of 
Total Assets 
Logarithm of 
Sales 
Operating 
Income to Total 
Assets 
Operating 
Income to Sales
Operating Income 
per Employee Sales per Employee
NonSShr  -0.1437 *** 0.2069 *** 0.0144 *** 0.0381 *** 2.2801 *** 51.5037*** 
  (0.0306) (0.0331) (0.0012) (0.0043) (0.2175) (2.5566) 
HHI  0.0037 *** 0.0022 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0055 *** 0.1403*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0016) (0.0191) 
R square  0.0684 0.0557 0.1252 0.0909 0.1286 0.3164 
Number of Observation 14226  14196  14226  14196  14226  14196  
Note: ***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% percentage, respectively. 
Panel C: Decomposition of Operating Income to Sales 
Independent Variables  
Managerial 
Expenses to 
Sales 
Financial 
Expenses to 
Sales 
Products 
Selling Profits 
to Sales 
Other Profits to 
Sales 
NonSShr  -0.0205 *** -0.0137 *** 0.0093 *** -0.0054 **
  (0.0036) (0.0012) (0.0028) (0.0020) 
HHI  0.0003 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0001 ***
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
          
R square  0.0456 0.0995 0.0240 0.0068 
Number of Observation 14196 14196 14196 14196 
Percentage in overall change of operating income to sales  
NonSShr  53.85%  35.91% 24.32% -14.08% 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% percentage, respectively. 
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Table 5 
The Impact of Initial and Subsequent Privatization 
This table summarizes the estimation results of model (2). 
 
Panel A: Social Welfare 
    Labor Price Tax 
Independent Variables  
Logarithm of 
Labor Wage per Labor
Welfare per 
Labor Price Index 
Tax (including 
Value Added Tax) 
Tax (excluding 
Value Added Tax)
First_Priv  -0.0815 ** 1.7270*** 0.2124*** -0.0243 0.5898 ** 0.2331 ** 
  (0.0236) (0.0947) (0.0175) (0.0180) (0.2230) (0.0706) 
Second_Priv  0.0975 * 0.6959** 0.1255** -0.0021 1.6848 ** 0.6546 ***
  (0.0553) (0.2439) (0.0439) (0.0449) (0.5584) (0.1767) 
Third_Priv  0.0679 -0.9768 -0.0937 0.2118 * -0.4789 -0.0492 
  (0.1245) (0.6925) (0.1248) (0.1275) (1.5856) (0.5016) 
Fourth_Priv  0.4121 -0.8967 -0.2346 -0.0237 -0.5377 1.9267 
  (0.5946) (2.7509) (0.4957) (0.5065) (6.2984) (1.9924) 
HHI  0.0024 *** 0.0141*** 0.0022*** 0.0043 *** 0.0558 *** 0.0179 ***
  (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0006) 
             
R square  0.0334 0.0405 0.0392 0.0095 0.0976 0.0982 
Number of Observation 14226  14226  14226  14189 14226  14226  
Note: ***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% percentage, respectively. 
 
Panel B: Firm Performance 
 
    Size of Operation  Profitability   Productivity 
Independent 
Variables  
Logarithm of Total 
Assets Logarithm of Sales  
Operating Income 
to Total Assets
Operating Income 
to Sales  
Operating Income 
per Employee Sales per Employee
First_Priv  0.0221  0.2700 ***  0.0133 *** 0.0322 ***  2.0404*** 43.0218***
  (0.0289) (0.0315)  (0.0012) (0.0041)  (0.2057) (2.4355) 
Second_Priv  -0.2343 0.1445 **  0.0061 ** 0.0183 *  0.8404 -9.0661 
  (0.6426) (0.0684)  (0.0029) (0.0101)  (0.5152) (6.0751) 
Third_Priv  -0.0307 0.3826 **  0.0033 0.0151  0.5743 -0.7086 
  (0.1820) (0.1939)  (0.0081) (0.0287)  (1.4627) (17.2493) 
Fourth_Priv  0.6725 0.5329  -0.0053 -0.0039  1.1646 -7.1149 
  (0.7227) (0.7699)  (0.0323) (0.1137)  (5.8103) (68.5178) 
HHI  0.0037 *** 0.0022 ***  0.0001 *** 0.00002 ***  0.0053*** 0.1331***
  (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0016) (0.0191) 
                
R square  0.0688 0.0599  0.1268 0.0912  0.1202 0.2361 
Number of Observation 14226  14196  14226  14196    14226  14226
Note: ***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% percentage, respectively. 
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Panel C: Decomposition of Operating Income to Sales 
Independent 
Variables   
Managerial 
Expenses to 
Sales 
Financial 
Expenses to 
Sales 
Products 
Selling Profits 
to Sales 
Other Profits 
to Sales 
First_Priv  -0.0127 *** -0.0125 *** 0.0106 *** -0.0036 * 
  (0.0034) (0.0012) (0.0026) (0.0019) 
Second_Priv  -0.0079 -0.0012 0.0083 0.0009 
  (0.0085) (0.0029) (0.0066) (0.0048) 
Third_Priv  -0.0169 0.0059 0.0104 -0.0065 
  (0.0240) (0.0083) (0.0186) (0.0136) 
Fourth_Priv  -0.0033 -0.0052 -0.0492 0.0368 
  (0.0952) (0.0329) (0.0738) (0.0538) 
HHI  0.0003 *** 0.00004 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0001 ***
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
          
R square  0.0447 0.0998 0.0250 0.0066 
Number of Observation  14196  14196 14196 14196 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% percentage, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Difference between Majority and Minority Non-state Ownership 
This table summarizes the estimation results of model (3). 
 
Panel A: Social Welfare 
    Labor Price Tax 
Independent Variables  
Logarithm of 
Labor Wage per Labor
Welfare per 
Labor Price Index 
Tax (including 
Value Added Tax) 
Tax (excluding 
Value Added Tax)
NonSShr_Maj  -0.1753 *** 1.8651*** 0.2284*** -0.0489 ** 0.1420  0.0901  
  (0.0646) (0.1007) (0.0181) (0.0186) (0.2304) (0.0729) 
NoSShr_Min  0.0875 ** 1.5192*** 0.2161*** 0.0875 ** 3.3437 *** 1.1982 ***
  (0.0395) (0.1773) (0.0320) (0.0327) (0.4057) (0.1283) 
HHI  0.0017 *** 0.0142*** 0.0022*** 0.0043 *** 0.0554 *** 0.0177 ***
  (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0006) 
              
R square  0.0358 0.0422 0.0404 0.0103 0.1005 0.1013 
Number of Observation 14226  14226  14226  14189 14226  14226  
Note: ***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% percentage, respectively. 
 
 
Panel B: Firm Performance 
    Size of Operation  Profitability  Productivity 
Independent 
Variables  
Logarithm of Total 
Assets Logarithm of Sales  
Operating Income 
to Total Assets
Operating Income 
to Sales  
Operating Income 
per Employee 
Sales per 
Employee 
NonSShr_Maj  -0.0614 ** 0.2600 ***  0.0144 *** 0.0370 ***  2.2797 *** 49.4758***
  (0.0301) (0.0327)  (0.0012) (0.0042)  (0.2126) (2.5020) 
NoSShr_Min  0.4554 *** 0.3976 ***  0.0127 *** 0.0252 ***  1.6328 *** 11.6870***
  (0.0481) (0.0518)  (0.0021) (0.0074)  (0.3745) (4.4065) 
HHI  0.0037 *** 0.0022 ***  0.0001 *** 0.00002 ***  0.0054 *** 0.1392***
  (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0016) (0.0191) 
                
R square  0.0742 0.0594  0.1265 0.0911  0.1018 0.2702 
Number of Observation 14226  14196  14226  14196    14226  14226
Note: ***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% percentage, respectively. 
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Panel C: Decomposition of Operating Income to Sales 
Independent 
Variables   
Managerial 
Expenses to 
Sales 
Financial 
Expenses to 
Sales 
Products 
Selling Profits 
to Sales 
Other Profits 
to Sales 
NonSShr_Maj  -0.0187 *** -0.0134 *** 0.0105 *** -0.0056 **
  (0.0035) (0.0012) (0.0027) (0.0020) 
NoSShr_Min  0.0054 -0.0094 *** 0.0169 *** 0.0043 
  (0.0062) (0.0021) (0.0048) (0.0035) 
HHI  0.0003 *** 0.00004 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0001 ***
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
          
R square  0.0447 0.0998 0.0250 0.0066 
Number of Observation  14196  14196 14196 14196 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% percentage, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Long-run Effects of Privatization 
This table summarizes the estimation results of model (4). 
 
Panel A: Social Welfare 
    Labor Price Tax 
Independent Variables  
Logarithm of 
Labor Wage per Labor
Welfare per 
Labor Price Index 
Tax (including 
Value Added Tax) 
Tax (excluding 
Value Added Tax)
NonSShr*Year_1_after -0.1874 *** 1.5420*** 0.1818*** -0.0286 -0.3596  -0.0535  
  (0.0454) (0.1521) (0.0274) (0.0280) (0.3481) (0.1102) 
NonSShr*Year_2_after -0.1741 *** 1.9278*** 0.2517*** -0.0696 ** 0.1921 0.1566 
  (0.0450) (0.1634) (0.0294) (0.0301) (0.3737) (0.1183) 
NonSShr*Year_3_after -0.1984 *** 1.9527*** 0.2217*** -0.1215 *** -0.1222 0.0233 
  (0.0464) (0.1943) (0.0350) (0.0357) (0.4443) (0.1406) 
NonSShr*Year_4_after -0.1848 *** 2.1233*** 0.2120*** -0.0993 ** -0.3314 0.0902 
  (0.065 (0.2719) (0.0490) (0.0499) (0.6216) (0.1967) 
HHI  0.0024 *** 0.0143*** 0.0023*** 0.0043 *** 0.0556 *** 0.0178 ***
  (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0006) 
              
R square  0.0365 0.0410 0.0386 0.0104 0.0963 0.0960 
Number of Observation  14226  14226  14226  14189 14226  14226  
Note: ***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% percentage, respectively. 
 
Panel B: Firm Performance 
    Size of Operation  Profitability  Productivity 
Independent Variables  
Logarithm of Total 
Assets Logarithm of Sales  
Operating Income 
to Total Assets
Operating Income 
to Sales  
Operating Income 
per Employee Sales per Employee
NonSShr*Year_1_after -0.1737 *** 0.1587 ***  0.0092 *** 0.0273 ***  1.4863 *** 39.5239***
  (0.0407) (0.0440)  (0.0018) (0.0063)  (0.3206) (3.7678) 
NonSShr*Year_2_after 0.1076 * 0.2475 ***  0.0168 *** 0.0437 ***  2.5353 *** 52.9779***
  (0.4511) (0.0484)  (0.0019) (0.0068)  (0.3443) (4.0457) 
NonSShr*Year_3_after 0.0120 ** 0.2568 ***  0.0180 *** 0.0461 ***  2.8696 *** 62.5143***
  (0.0555) (0.0590)  (0.0023) (0.0080)  (0.4094) (4.8110) 
NonSShr*Year_4_after -0.1787 ** 0.1925 **  0.0179 *** 0.0431 ***  3.1100 *** 66.8582***
  (0.0764) (0.0801)  (0.0032) (0.0113)  (0.5730) (6.7337) 
HHI  0.0037 *** 0.0022 ***  0.0001 *** 0.00001 ***  0.0056 *** 0.1411***
  (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0016) (0.0191) 
                
R square  0.0685 0.0559  0.1261 0.0913  0.1014 0.2546 
Number of Observation   14226 14196  14226  14196    14226  14226 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% percentage, respectively. 
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Panel C: Decomposition of Operating Income to Sales 
Independent Variables   
Managerial 
Expenses to 
Sales 
Financial 
Expenses to 
Sales 
Products Selling 
Profits to Sales
Other Profits to 
Sales 
NonSShr*Year_1_after -0.0087 *** -0.0121 *** 0.0124 ** -0.0059 * 
  (0.0005) (0.0018) (0.0041) (0.0030) 
NonSShr*Year_2_after -0.0217 *** -0.0129 *** 0.0138 ** -0.0047 
  (0.0057) (0.0020) (0.0044) (0.0032) 
NonSShr*Year_3_after -0.0311 *** -0.0157 *** 0.0039 -0.0046 
  (0.0067) (0.0023) (0.0052) (0.0038) 
NonSShr*Year_4_after -0.0371 *** -0.0175 *** -0.0041 -0.0073 
  (0.0095) (0.0033) (0.0073) (0.0054) 
HHI  0.0003 *** 0.00004 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0001 ***
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
          
R square  0.0464 0.0998 0.0250 0.0068 
Number of Observation   14196  14196  14196  14196  
Note: ***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% percentage, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
